Over Syria, a Tale of Two Pilots

By Mac William Bishop

Aboard the U.S.S. George H.W. Bush at Sea, August 1st, 2017

Early on the morning of June 18th in the clear skies over Syria, U.S. Navy Lt. Cdr. Michael Tremel encountered Syrian Arab Air Force Lt. Col. Ali Fahd.

Only one man would fly away from the encounter.

Tremel was flying combat air support with Strike Fighter Squadron 87, the “Golden Warriors”, for anti-ISIS coalition troops advancing against enemy positions near Tabqah on the outskirts of Raqqa. His F/A-18E Super Hornet was armed with multiple air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions. For the past several months, his squadron had been carrying out strike missions over Mosul, Raqqa and southern Syria in an effort to help ground forces eject the extremist group from its remaining bastions.

Tremel had been a naval aviator for 12 years, deploying over Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve. This was the Pennsylvanian’s second deployment carrying out strikes against the Islamic State, or ISIS.

Fahd was conducting strike operations in support of Syrian government forces, according to the Syrian Ministry of Defense, also conducting an offensive against ISIS. His Su-22 Fitter, primarily a ground attack aircraft, was armed with multiple air-to-surface munitions. With family roots in Al-Salamiyah in eastern Syria, Fahd had been flying combat missions against rebel-held areas since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, six years prior. He had flown more than 2,000 sorties in that time.

“As our flight returned to Syria in early June, we had witnessed increasing tensions between pro-regime forces and coalition forces on the ground,” Tremel said.

Tremel had just completed a close air support mission when he first became aware of an unidentified aircraft as it closed in on SDF positions. An American E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft – essentially a flying air traffic control and radar platform – confirmed it as a Syrian aircraft: Fahd’s Su-22. Tremel and his wingman maneuvered their fighters to intercept.

As he closed with the Syrian aircraft, Tremel said he witnessed it lining up for a bomb run.

Personnel aboard the AWACS tried to radio Fahd on “a civilian emergency channel,” likely 121.5Mhz, also known as the guard channel. The guard channel is a universal frequency reserved for aircraft in distress and emergency communications. Despite numerous attempts, Fahd did not respond. Personnel from Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) also contacted Russian air control using the previously established “deconfliction channel,” in an effort to waive the Syrian aircraft off its attack.

“The Syrian airspace is one of the most dynamic that I’ve ever flown in,” said U.S. Navy Capt. Jim McCall, the commander of Carrier Air Wing 8, to which Tremel’s squadron is assigned. “I would venture to say it’s probably one of the most dynamic airspaces that U.S. forces have flown in during my entire time in the military.”

With Syrian attack aircraft, Russian bombers, American warplanes and a host of fighters from other nations taking part in Operation Inherent Resolve, the airspace over Syria has become “an incredibly congested place,” McCall said. Add to this the presence of some of the world’s most sophisticated air defenses, including Russian-made (and sometimes operated) S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles and shoulder-carried man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) employed by rebels and jihadists alike, and you have a potent threat to air crews operating over Syria.

Numerous government aircraft have been shot down by various groups in Syria. Coalition aircraft have also been downed, either through mechanical failure or enemy action, including an F-16 near Raqqa in December 2014.

The pilot of that F-16, Royal Jordanian Air Force Lt. Muath Al-Kasasbeh, was captured and publicly burned alive by ISIS a month later.

Coalition airpower has been critical to the campaign to oust ISIS from its strongholds. During its deployment, McCall’s carrier air wing alone carried out 1,900 sorties – and it was only one of dozens of American units conducting air support. Much of that was in support of the liberation of Mosul, a brutal months-long fight that resulted in the deaths of thousands of combatants and civilians.

“What played out over the last nine to ten months [was] some of the most intense urban combat that the world’s seen since World War II,” U.S. Army Col. Pat Work, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team told reporters in Mosul in June. Although the bulk of that fight was conducted by Iraqi forces, American intelligence, indirect fire and close air support “whipped ISIS in Mosul and is whipping them right now in Raqqa,” Work said.

Back in the skies over Tabqah, the American aircraft were trying to intercept Fahd’s Su-22. Above them was an ominous sign. They were being shadowed by a Russian Su-27 Flanker: an advanced air superiority fighter that – unlike the Syrian attack jet – could be considered a “peer competitor” for the American Super Hornets.

Meanwhile, Fahd continued toward the SDF positions.

As the AWACs crew tried to raise Fahd on the radio, Tremel tried another tactic to get the Syrian pilot’s attention: maneuvering in front of the Fitter, he attempted a “head butt.” By placing his aircraft directly in front of the Syrian’s, the Super Hornet created a wake of turbulence that would be impossible to ignore.

But Fahd didn’t change course.

Finally, Tremel activated his flares – part of the Super Hornet’s anti-missile countermeasures system. There were any number of reasons why the Syrian pilot might not have received a radio communication. He might have a faulty radio or headset. He might be so intent on his target that he simply didn’t hear the communications. But the flares would be an unmistakable sign the U.S. Navy was warning him away.

Tremel said he attempted “numerous times flying over his head and putting out flares to try to warn him he’s getting closer and closer and closer to our forces.”

Even this didn’t work.

“I think it’s very commonly known that we try to tamp down any potential interactions between [Russian, Syrian and coalition] aircraft in theater; we also try to deconflict any ongoing operations that we’re doing on the ground to try to tamp down any potential misunderstandings,” McCall said. “But at all points, we load our aircraft with self-defense missiles. That happens whether we’re flying in Iraq or we’re flying in Syria – it’s just a matter of fact about the way we do business. It happens when we’re flying missions really anywhere we’re deployed.”

Tremel witnessed Fahd release munitions toward coalition positions. His guidance was clear: to protect the ground troops. Tremel acted.

Moving back into firing position, he got a lock on Fahd’s plane and fired an AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missile.

Standard operating procedure would be for Tremel to declare “Fox two,” over the radio, issuing the NATO call signifying weapons release and denoting the type of munition. “We cannot confirm [Tremel’s] radio transmissions,” said U.S. Army Col. Joseph Scrocca, the public affairs director for CJTF-OIR, citing operational security.

The Sidewinder is about 9 feet long. It travels toward its target at more than 3,000 miles per hour. When its infrared proximity fuse detects an aircraft is is in range, 20 pounds of explosives in its warhead detonate, sending thousands of titanium fragments in an expanding ring at supersonic speeds. The forward momentum turns this ring into a cone of destruction, designed to cripple or destroy enemy aircraft. The basic design has been in service for more than 60 years.

But today, the Sidewinder missed.

Tremel selected another missile, an AIM-120 AMRAAM, a much larger munition with nearly twice the payload of a Sidewinder.

“Fox three,” is the NATO radio call to denote an AMRAAM release.

The AMRAAM is directed to its target by radar – essentially riding the signal all the way to a point near the target, where its warhead detonates in a fashion similar to the Sidewinder, but with a lot more punch.

The missile detonated, its fragments peppering Fahd’s Su-22 and punching through its airframe like a shotgun blasting pellets through a tin can.

Tremel said he didn’t witness what happened next, but his wingman was flying a short distance behind and saw the result of the missile strike. The Syrian aircraft was disabled, but not completely destroyed. As smoke poured from what was now just gliding wreckage, the wingman watched as Fahd ejected, and his parachute successfully deployed.

“From the time of detection to the time of the shoot down was about eight minutes,” Tremel said. “There’s not time to go back and ask all these people ‘What about this? What about that?’”

“You have to understand exactly what [the commander’s] intent is, what the rules of engagement are.”

While the engagement was over, the situation was still tense. The Russian Su-27 was still shadowing the American fighters, who had just shot down one of its allies. There was no precedent for the situation, and it was unclear how the Syrians or Russians would react.

Tremel was low on fuel: after nearly five hours of flying, he had been nearing the end of his mission when he encountered the Syrian aircraft. There was nothing further for him to accomplish on this patrol. He still had an aerial refueling and 90 minutes of flying in order to make it back to his carrier, the U.S.S. George H.W. Bush, steaming in the seas south of Cypress in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the end of his flight – as at the end of every successful carrier mission – what awaited was a trap, or arrested landing, itself one of the most dangerous aspects of naval aviation. There was no time for reflection.

“I was just focused on my egress from Syrian airspace,” Tremel said.

In the days that followed, American air operations were halted as the U.S. and Russian militaries communicated in an effort to de-escalate the situation.

Meanwhile, Fahd’s ordeal was far from over.

Ejecting from a damaged aircraft is a violent and traumatic experience, often resulting in multiple injuries, such as fractures and lacerations. The Syrian pilot also suffered extensive injuries from the impact of the missile, although the nature of these injuries is not immediately clear. Furthermore, Fahd was flying over territory that was a patchwork of regime, rebel and ISIS control. There was no question what would happen to him should he fall into ISIS hands; he would fare just as badly in the hands of some rebel groups, as well.

Fahd had ejected over the Badia, an arid range of steppes where in better days bedouin took their herds to graze. The nearest point Fahd might find friendly forces was a village called Shuwaihat.

“This the news that we’ve had: that after only 24 hours the [Syrian] Army rescued him and that he’s in a hospital; that he’s been recovered by the Kurds and is being treated,” said Mohyddin Fahd, the pilot’s cousin via a video released in June. “But nothing is clear. We don't know where he is, nor what fate he has experienced at this point.”

“His children are waiting for him to come home.”

Moyhddin is a pro-regime media activist; his statements could not be independently verified.

I asked a representative of the SDF units operating near Tabqah if they had any information about Fahd, and was told they did not. Col Scrocca from CJTF-OIR said he had “no information on this,” and referred the matter to the Syrian government.

A Syrian government spokesperson, when asked for clarification about the incident and Fahd’s status, declined comment other than to confirm a pilot was missing.

Tremel was the first U.S. Navy pilot to shoot down a manned aircraft in 26 years.

But he would soon be back in the air over Syria, risking his life in the fight against ISIS. The deployment wasn’t over yet.

Fahd, meanwhile, has disappeared into the carnage of the war, his fate unknown.